In attempting to represent political transformations, we often encounter a moment that seems to resist narrativisation, a moment of obstinate inconsistency which various theoretical, historical and fictional accounts cannot properly absorb except by way of indicating the parameters of a rupture.
ISSN 1847-7755; doi: 10.15291/sic/2.5.lc.2 3 appearance marks a breach or paradox. To the extent that the intelligibility of the narrative form itself relies on a rectilinear chronology, it fails to capture this moment of contraction.
[1] Conversely, if we were able to fully represent the moment of revolutionary transformation, the resulting chronological account would render the transformation as a product of the preceding order, as continuous with it, thereby dissolving its revolutionary status.
The paradigmatic case of a folded chronology can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's classic political text -The Social Contract . In describing the possibility of a legitimate political origin based on authorisation, Rousseau states:
For a nascent people to be capable of appreciating sound maxims of politics and of following the fundamental rules of reason of State, the effect would have to become the cause, the social spirit which is to be the work of the institution would have to preside over the institution itself, and men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of them. (71)
The problem identified by Rousseau is as follows: In order for a political entity to be thought of as legitimate, in order for it to have the right to compel obedience from its citizens, the entity in question must be authorised by the community. In authorising a sovereign entity, the protocitizens renounce the natural liberty which characterised their pre-political life in exchange for new freedoms and the security of the collective. The key problem noted by Rousseau in the quotation above is that in order to imagine a political community which emerges out of a contract, one that is legitimate insofar as it is based on consent, one needs to presuppose a collection of individuals who think and behave like citizens. The 'social spirit' which is supposed to be the product of the contract must already exist in order for the original contracting moment to take place. Rousseau's solution was to posit a 'legislator' who stands above the process. The legislator would be capable of "changing human nature; of transforming each individual who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger whole from which that individual would as it were receive his life and being" (69). Introducing the figure of the legislator has important implications for Rousseau's argument. Authority no longer emerges exclusively from the people, but relies on the educative powers of a quasi-external figure. Rousseau's account fails by usual narrative standards because the appearance of the legislator cannot be definitely located. If the legislator exists prior to the The problem Derrida notes is that the conditions required for the event of signing to take place are only logically conceivable as an effect of the event. There is no pre-existing norm which could authorise the signers prior to the act of signing since it is only by virtue of their signature that they exist as a political entity. This forces us to view their signature as retroactively altering the status of the act of signing. Rousseau recognised one aspect of this retroactivity. Choosing to exit the state of nature and enter into a political community based on a social contract requires pre-political humans to recognise in advance the advantages political life will bring. Derrida intensifies this problematic, however, insofar as he notes the unauthorized status of the signers who only acquire the authority to sign once the act of signing is complete. The signers must sign on behalf of the future community they will comprise.
[2] Whereas a Rousseauian natural man is only conceivable as an individual capable of signing contracts once this initial contract has been signed, for Derrida the signers lack the authority to sign since their authority comes about only after the signing has taken place. Both the Declaration of Independence and the Social Contract contain a moment which resists chronological exposition. As soon as one attempts a proper chronological ordering, one encounters a paradoxical moment in which effects must serve to bring about their own causes. This is what Derrida terms the moment's 'mystique' -the sense that no amount of knowledge will allow The same logic applies to revolutionary moments. [5] Since a revolution involves a re-foundation, a momentary return to the state of openness which characterised the original instituting act, it must also, in some sense, authorise itself. As Derrida notes, the "origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground" ("Force of Law" 14). The guiding question for this section will be whether it is possible to delineate a notion of the decision which avoids pure decisionism, that is, decisionism as unimpeded sovereign will, or as Marder states apropos Schmittian decisionism, as "power in its actuality, an always already exteriorized expression of political existence" (131). The revolutionary act would thus, according to a decisionist logic, be purely selfgrounded and coextensive with the will of the subject. The concept of the decision we arrive at via Derrida and Laclau is distinct from pure decisionism in several important ways. I will look at each thinker's theorisation of the decision in order to see if either can present a reconfiguration of the concept consistent with a radical democratic project.
In his essay "Force of Law: 'The Mystical Foundations of Authority'" Derrida conceives a revolutionary founding act in a way that allows him to successfully outflank the charge of decisionism. [6] Although the revolutionary actors must act in the absence of a legitimising normative framework (since it is precisely this framework that their activity aims to produce), the way in which they relate to their activity distinguishes revolutionary acts from a decisionist assertion of will.
[7] As Derrida argues: The phrase "discourse of self-legitimation" is crucial here. It is clear enough that for a revolutionary movement to be successful, it must draw impetus from a discourse that legitimises its activity. But it is equally clear that such a discourse must also be produced by this very activity. This is a problem insofar as a legitimating discourse needs to be anchored in a ground or founding truth which goes beyond it. If a revolutionary gesture were transparently self-grounding there would be no way it could appear to be legitimate, not even to the revolutionary actors themselves, since the very logic of legitimation requires an immutable legitimating bedrock which is external to, and unaffected by, that upon which it confers legitimacy. A pure decisionism would involve a transparently self-grounding act. In contrast, if a revolutionary act can be considered selfgrounding in a way that is opaque to the actors involved, this may allow us to conceptualise radical political transformations which do not encounter the problems of pure decisionism.
In contradistinction to a pure decisionism, I argue that Derrida formulates a notion of revolutionary action which involves a quasi-transcendental gesture where this 'quasi' serves to indicate, as Marchart argues, "that all transcendental conditions will always emerge out of particular empiricohistorical conjunctures" (25). The quasi-transcendental operation thus consists in a misrecognition which casts one's own historically conditioned claim as a trans-historical postulate. [8] because it is "so near to him". Insofar as the very notion of legitimacy demands a distance between the particular act and the ground that legitimates it, the revolutionary act must perform a double manoeuvre that both launches a re-articulation of the concepts of freedom, justice and equality, as well as positing a transcendental ground which serves to legitimise this re-articulation. Crucially, this posited ground, in order to perform its legitimating function, must be perceived as immutable by the revolutionaries themselves even while it originates from their own activity . We are thus able to introduce a minimal, but all important, distance between pure decisionism and the decision associated with a quasi-transcendental gesture. In the case of pure decisionism, the content of the decision is transparent to the decider. There is no standard against which the decision could be held except the will of this individual since it transparently originates with their own act. In contrast, a quasi-transcendental decision includes both a particular content that is decided upon and a new standard against which this content will be measured. But even though this new standard issues directly from the revolutionaries' activity, the experience of the production of the new standard is not recoverable after the event as a freely willed act. Attempting to retrospectively plot the revolutionary transformation as a consistent narrative arc therefore necessarily results in failure;
instead of recapturing the decisive moment between the build-up and the aftermath, the moment at which things "really happened," we always encounter a moment of circularity (or unrepresentability) insofar as the evental change requires us to think in terms of the discontinuity implied by a fold or entanglement in which the result of the change serves as its precondition.
In his Emancipation(s) , Laclau provides a comprehensive account of the logical problems pertaining to revolutionary re-foundations:
As we have seen, the condition of the radical chasm that the emancipatory logic requires is the 
(Emancipation(s) 6)
This opaqueness, I argue, corresponds in practice to the moment of foundation. In order for a political act to be considered as a radical emancipation, it is necessary for it to formulate itself as a re-foundation as opposed to acknowledging continuity with the previous regime. But the vital moment at which the newly founded political entity posits its own founding normative framework, distinct from that of the previous regime, cannot be perceived as part of the revolutionary work;
instead, it persists in a negative sense, either surfacing as an aporia marking the void at the centre of the revolutionary passage, or as a chaotic hiatus in which the multitude of positively given events and factors obfuscates an originary dislocation.
Laclau finds an analogy to the moment of political origin in debates concerning the status of zero in relation to the order of number:
[sic] -a journal of literature, culture and literary translation Zero is required in order to ground the system of number. If it is possible to conceive of plurality, it must also be possible to conceive of a total subtraction, and yet after this subtraction we would be left with zero, a term which is not representable in terms of plurality but which is nonetheless logically required as soon as we begin to think number as a system. Without the term 'zero' we would have no expression for the absence of quantity and would be left in the absurd position of describing absence in terms of a tendency towards infinite scarcity. However, the price of this use of zero is the introduction of heterogeneity into the order of number:
With respect to the system, the zero is an undecidable tension between internality and externalitybut an internality that does not exclude heterogeneity. The zero, in the second place, is 'innommable', unnameable; but at the same time it produces effects, it closes the system, even at the price of making it hopelessly heterogeneous. (Laclau, Rhetorical Foundations 84)
Moreover, Laclau points out that 'zero,' despite naming the absence of number, must be represented as number, always appearing in the guise of a 'one' (Butler, Laclau, .
This feature of the analogy between the order of number and the founding act that constitutes a political order allows us to segue into a discussion concerning the issue of representability.
Constituting the order of number depends on the inclusion of an element, the zero, which is heterogeneous with respect to number and therefore not representable within it. This leads Laclau to argue that for a given system of meaning to successfully found itself, a certain repression must accompany the moment of origin, leading to its unrepresentability: "Insofar as an act of institution has been successful, a 'forgetting of the origins' tends to occur: the system of possible alternatives tends to vanish and the traces of the original contingency to fade. In this way, the instituted tends to assume the form of mere objective presence" ( New Reflections 34). As this quotation indicates, Laclau's point is that each founding moment includes a gesture of exclusion through which alternative historical trajectories are ruled out. While I am in agreement with Laclau, my argument here is that the hegemonic operation also involves a quasi-transcendental gesture since the very act by which the political order founds itself must be expelled from the revolutionary narrative. Or alternatively, the revolutionaries must transcendentalize (i.e., posit as transcendental instead of empirical) the ground which will then serve to legitimate their activity. It is this aspect of the subject's revolutionary activity which leads Laclau to a definition of the subject as "the distance between the undecidable structure and the decision" ( New Reflections 30). The act is hegemonic in the sense that it excludes possible alternatives, but it is quasi-transcendental in the sense that it obscures its own site of origin. If the hegemonic operation could be transparently fixed to the willed activity of the revolutionary subjects themselves, their political endeavours would be selfgrounding in a decisionistic sense that would undermine any claim to legitimacy; only insofar as it is also quasi-transcendental are we able to preserve its radical status without slipping into a decisionistic position. To clarify this last point, both decisionistic and quasi-transcendental perspectives on the act recognise that it is self-grounding, however, while for decisionism the act grounds itself in a way that is transparent to the actor concerned, a quasi-transcendental act involves a gesture which is necessarily opaque.
We have mentioned two possible strategies for constructing representations of the moment of refoundation. On the one hand we have a chronological-linear strategy which attempts to read the revolution as an event necessitated by a series of causes, as well as necessitating its own effects.
This strategy suffers from the problem, outlined by Rousseau, that in order to arrive at the revolutionary moment, certain effects must precede their causes. On the other hand, we could read the pre-revolutionary situation synchronically, as a field of positively given objective facts which, taken together, constitute an unanswerable challenge to the existing regime. The problem here is that it still takes a subject to decide that a deadlock has been encountered and that a solution cannot be reached through normal institutional means. That these modes of representation remain durable despite their internal inconsistencies could be seen as a result of their mythical function.
Laclau states, "The moment of myth's realization is consequently the moment of the subject's eclipse and its reabsorption by the structure -the moment at which the subject is reduced to a In making this claim regarding sedimented practices, Laclau is attempting to distinguish his position from decisionism, however, the position he ends up taking not only contradicts claims he makes elsewhere, but is unnecessary since, as I have sought to argue, the decisionist charge can be answered in a way that does not threaten the possibility of radical political change. I would like to therefore risk the claim that there are no practices which are so thoroughly sedimented that they could not in principle be reactivated by a sufficiently radical reinvestment. This position can be tested against Laclau's comments on political communities' 'unshakable beliefs'. Laclau argues that a contingent decision that comes into conflict with unshakeable beliefs would not be effective (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 83) . We can extrapolate here on Laclau's behalf and posit a distinction between unshakeable beliefs which cannot be challenged and other beliefs which can be challenged and, at least potentially, overturned. This leads Laclau to argue that although a political order can experience "deep dislocations [and] recompositions . . . it never disappears to the point of requiring a total act of refoundation" (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 82) . If Laclau is to be supported here, it is nonetheless also vital to point out that the boundary between these kinds of beliefs cannot be seen in advance. From the perspective of a proto-revolutionary political subject, it would be impossible to distinguish between practices and beliefs which are unshakeably sedimented and which could be vulnerable to reactivation. So in this case, one could argue that even though deep dislocations are possible, the potential scope of these dislocations is given in advance while nonetheless remaining indeterminate from the perspective of political actors. This makes Laclau's position as stated in his Emancipation(s) less appealing for our purposes since it sets immutable limits on what can be achieved in a given political situation, albeit limits that cannot be detected in advance. This oscillation between a theory of radical (but non-decisionistic) rupture and an alternative emphasis on immutably sedimented practices is also found in a recent collection of essays published just after his death. In his The Rhetorical Foundations of Society , Laclau takes a more radical position with respect to the problem of origins: "something is originary insofar as it does not need to go outside itself in order to constitute what it is" (15). It would appear here that Laclau holds a truly originary act to be fully self-sufficient, and yet in the same volume Laclau argues, "We live in a world of sedimented social practices that limit the range of what is thinkable and decidable" (134). Laclau's inconsistency here is to be seen as symptomatic of a desire to theorise radical freedom by showing how humans are capable of abruptly transforming their sociopolitical relations whilst simultaneously evading the charge that such a freedom is indistinguishable from, and therefore essentially identical to, decisionism. My argument, which runs in the spirit of Laclau's project without fully endorsing his position, is that the distinction between radical freedom and decisionism can be sustained so long as we accept the vital caveat that this distinction is only available from a subjectively engaged perspective. A political subject is free so long as they perceive themselves as bound to the consequences of their free act just as Rousseau's citizen can be "forced to be free" (Rousseau 53 ). The decisionist, in contrast, only obeys the ebb and flow of their own will. In the case of pure decisionism, there can be no commitment to the consequences of a decision since the only ground that can be appealed to is the arbitrary will of the subject. This subject could not have an experience of the ethical since this would imply an external standard by which decisions could be evaluated. Decisionism is ethically empty for precisely this reason. In contrast, a quasi-transcendental decision involves a radical investment which gives the weight of the ethical to a given normative system. The revolutionary subject whose act produces a new normative system, a system that then receives ethical density via a radical investment, is herself bound by the new normative standard she has instituted. If this new normative standard were not binding, or to be more precise, if the subject whose act produces the new normative framework no longer views this framework as ethically binding, we immediately slip into a decisionist position. It is thus the fundamental risk and promise of the political that one cannot be sure in advance that the constituting act will not eventually prove to be decisionistic. Moreover, any certainty on this score will only be available to the subject who is already engaged in the process; from an outsider's perspective a quasi-transcendental gesture may well be indistinguishable from 'pure decisionism'.
The thorny issue of subjective engagement has implications for our analysis of historical events.
Consider, for example, the opposed ideologies of National Socialism and Soviet Communism. The distinction between a founding quasi-transcendental gesture and pure decisionism can allow us to illuminate one aspect of the asymmetry between these two political movements. National Socialism To return to the distinction between decisionism and quasi-transcendentalism, one can see how decisionist ideologies lead to the ethical vacuity of the political subjects who endorse them, while in contrast, quasi-transcendentalism leads to subjective ethical engagement. The communist subject labours in the service of ideals which are seen as exceeding her (i.e., posited as the actions of the regime and the citizenry are held. This is why the communist governments could fail by their own standards, leading dissidents to call, for example, for 'Socialism with a human face,' whereas in contrast, it would be absurd to imagine accusations from within the Nazi Party criticizing Hitler for improperly adhering to the tenets of National Socialism and on that basis demanding 'Nazism with a human face'. One can thus see how the distinction between decisionism and quasi-transcendentalism is not a mere theoretical indulgence but has real implications at the level of empirical-historical analysis.
It is now possible to offer a few concluding remarks on the complex issue of radical, nondecisionistic moments of change. The insight that appears through a close reading of specific passages of the works of Derrida, Arendt and Laclau is that thinking through the possibility of radical political acts requires us to endorse a heterogeneous, non-linear temporality. A founding act, as distinct from a Schmittian decision, is experienced as a disturbance in narrative rather than an additional positive narrative element. By placing Laclau in dialogue with Ricoeur and others, we can see how the 'constitutive distortion' that accompanies a founding performance blocks the totalising imperative to view the past as cohering in a single seamless whole. It is a distortion which is necessary if the founding act is to have quasi-transcendental as opposed to decisionistic status.
But insofar as the constitutive distortion is successful, that is to say, insofar as the founding act is transcendentalized and the revolutionary founders themselves perceive their act as emanating from, or grounded in, something which goes beyond them, the moment of founding itself must be suspended from view. Retrospectively, the founding act then appears only as a moment of circularity in which the causal nexus is momentarily derailed by an unconditioned decision made in a moment of undecidability. [2] Bonnie Honig emphasises the way in which the rhetorical force of the declaration arises from its undecidability as a constative or performative statement. I accept Honig's approach but do not see it as incompatible with my own emphasis on the impossibility of a full chronological exposition of the act of signing (Honig 105) .
Works Cited
[3] This is akin to what E. E. Berns refers to as the "constitutive lack of completeness . . . a fold, an empty place, a dislocation" (76). While I agree with this characterisation, I am more concerned with the temporal aspects of this dislocation as a fold in chronology or narrative.
[4] I use the term 'contingent' here to refer to outcomes that are not necessitated by prior conditions. That is not to say that contingency is the opposite of necessity, but rather, following
Laclau, that contingency is an internal subversive moment within necessity, that which distorts or disturbs necessity and "hinders its full constitution" (Laclau, New Reflections 27).
[5] I consider revolutionary moments to be those historical points at which power is not concentrated in a single political entity (e.g., a king, a president, a general in the army) but is diffused throughout the population. At such moments there is a shift from constituted power (power concentrated in a particular political actor) to constitutive power (the inalienable power of the people reconstitutes their government). The distinction between constituted and constitutive power is drawn from Arendt's reading of Seiyes in On Revolution (163).
[6] The position I take on Derrida's concept of the decision only holds for the kind of decision implied in the works under consideration here. The understanding of the decision that features in "Force of Law" and "Declarations of Independence" does not lead to the conclusion arrived at by Camil Ungureanu for whom "Derrida and Schmitt can be confidently placed in the same category" (296).
[7] By 'legitimizing normative framework,' I simply refer to the idea that while governments are legitimated by a certain accepted discourse (e.g., contemporary Western governments are legitimated by periodic elections which are taken to be expressions of the will of the people), revolutionaries must act in the absence of such a discourse. Revolutionary activity must always at first seem to be a wild, unauthorized outburst. This is why part of the revolutionary work is to produce a discourse which legitimizes the revolutionary upheaval such as the aspiration to selfgovernment (e.g., the American Revolution) or the demand for freedom from economic hardship produced by inequality (e.g., the French Revolution).
[8] In this use of the term 'quasi-transcendental' I take my lead from Oliver Marchart who describes the two aspects indicated by the 'quasi': "one aspect which the 'quasi' indicates is that ground and abyss, conditions of possibility and impossibility, are inseparably interwoven, and the other aspect indicated by the 'quasi' is that all transcendental conditions will always emerge out of particular empirico-historical conjunctures" (25).
